



MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Walsh

SUBJECT : Study of Reconnaissance Operations

Background

• On 5 June 1973 Dr. Kissinger asked the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the DCI, for a study of those airborne, surface, overhead [redacted] reconnaissance operations subject to monthly approval by the 40 Committee and those operated in Southeast Asia. The study with findings and recommendations should be submitted to the 40 Committee by 30 July 1973. (TAB A)

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• On 13 June Mr. Schlesinger, as DCI, informed Mr. Clements a) that Allen, Graham and [redacted] would be responsible for the DCI's consultative role, b) that CIA would develop value judgments on programs serving national intelligence, and c) that USIB would provide its views on the value of all programs. (TAB B)

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• The 30 July due date could not be met and a new due date was set for 31 August.

• On 26 July, [redacted] sent a status report to Mr. Proctor (TAB C). Because of the similarity of views developed jointly by CIA and DOD on the value of programs serving national intelligence, it was decided--with the approval of Graham and [redacted]--that a separate CIA value judgment was not required. The only significant difference on value between CIA and DOD thus far pertains to the risk [redacted] We feel that this can be handled best at the 40 Committee review and not at the USIB where only value is to be addressed.

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Work to be Done

For USIB Meeting: Review the study and affirm judgments on the value of those programs serving national intelligence needs.* Prepare and coordinate briefing memorandum for the CIA Member of USIB.

For 40 Committee Meeting: Review the study and develop judgments related to options, risks and recommendations. Prepare such comments as may be required by the DCI.

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*Southeast Asia, [] and about nine of 37 airborne programs.

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DATE: 9 August 1973

TO: Paul Walsh

FROM: [REDACTED]

SUBJECT: Peripheral Reconnaissance Study

REMARKS:

1. The attached note prepared by [REDACTED] on the background and the current status of the DOD peripheral reconnaissance study is for your information. We can brief you in more detail at your convenience.

2. We have had very few substantive problems in the exercise. Trouble, if it comes, will be the result of DOD procedures in moving this paper through USIB and to the 40 Committee. Because the ground rules do not permit us to participate in preparing the options, risks and conclusions/recommendations portions of the paper, it will be important that we see the full study as soon as possible. Unless you instruct us otherwise, we will ask IC Staff (Graham/[REDACTED]) to assist us in this regard.

ACTION

*BEST COPY
AVAILABLE*

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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

DDI-328-73

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Dear Bill,

13 JUN 1973

Henry Kissinger's letter of 5 June requested you to organize and conduct a study of reconnaissance operations for the use of the 40 Committee and to consult with the Director of Central Intelligence on the usefulness of the intelligence product derived from these operations. I intend to be responsive to your study in the following way:

a. General Lew Allen, my Deputy for the Intelligence Community, will coordinate for me on this matter and will work with your designated Defense people in charge of the study. To this end, he plans to use General Danny Graham and Admiral Mac Showers in the details of that involvement.

b. I will have the CIA provide me an assessment of the value of the product derived from the operations being examined to national intelligence and seek the views of the U. S. Intelligence Board on this value assessment.

c. I also plan to solicit the views of USIB on the usefulness of intelligence collected by all systems addressed in the letter in response to USIB objectives and priority requirements in general.

d. I will then provide you with my views.

In order to accomplish these USIB assessments and include responsiveness to national and other intelligence requirements, I suggest that you ask your designee to make available to General Allen the results of their studies along with whatever judgments and assessments they develop concerning the requirements being satisfied by these collection systems. General Graham and Admiral [redacted] are available to meet with your designated participants at

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any time and to the extent necessary to complete the requested evaluations by the time set in the letter.

Sincerely,

/s/ James R. Schlesinger

James R. Schlesinger

The Honorable William P. Clements, Jr.
Acting Secretary of Defense
3 E 880, The Pentagon
Washington, D. C.

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27 July 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Proctor

SUBJECT : Peripheral Reconnaissance Review

You will recall that Dr. Kissinger ordered a DOD study of the programs in the JRC monthly schedule. That study is to be submitted to 40 Committee members who, in turn, will prepare a report to the President.

- The memorandum also directed that the DCI be "consulted with regard to the usefulness of the intelligence product..."
- Subsequently, Mr. Schlesinger advised Secretary Clements that he would have CIA do the value assessments as they pertain to national intelligence and also would solicit the views of USIB on the across-the-board usefulness of the products. He designated Lew Allen, Danny Graham and [redacted] as his coordinators on the interagency evaluations.

The original deadline for the study to reach the 40 Committee was 30 July. This has been extended to 31 August.

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Dr. Hall is in charge of the DOD effort and has an ad hoc (informal) committee of principals which has met only once to date. This was the meeting I attended in your place when you were not well. Also there were Lew Allen, Ray Cline, and members of the DOD Steering Committee.

- The DOD Steering Committee is chaired by General Davidson with representatives from DIA (Hughes), the JCS and the JRC.
- The actual work is being done by six DOD task teams. We have a representative to each for the official purpose of making inputs on value judgments.

The DOD report will be organized on a target area basis except for the special Navy program. All programs will be considered in terms of information needs, level of collection, product and its use, risk, and alternative means of collection as these pertain to targets in:

- USSR
- Eastern Europe
- China
- North Korea
- Mediterranean and Mid East
- Cuba
- Southeast Asia
- special Navy interests

As the work progressed, the focal point for drafting the report on the first five of the above areas centered on working under the direction of John Hughes. We have been fully involved in the preparation of these sections and our contributions and comments on all factors are reflected in the present drafts.


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25X1 Last week, John Hughes, [] Danny Graham and I met with [] to go over the status of the [] drafts on the first five areas. We are in good shape with respect to agreed views in these reports. All of our value judgments are incorporated in the reports along with our comments on other factors including any recommended adjustments in the level of collection and risks involved. 25X1

25X1 The Southeast Asia report was developed by another task team under a DIA [] It incorporates much of a previous paper which John Hughes and George Carver had prepared for USIB and the NSC. We now have the draft of the Southeast Asia section and in coordinating it with appropriate Agency elements (including SAVA) no problems emerged.



25X1 Yesterday (26 July), John Hughes, [] Danny Graham and I met for the purpose of going over the status of the [] sections with the respective chairmen of those task teams and to set up the format and timing for USIB review of the value judgments. The meeting resulted in agreement that: 25X1

- there are no problems with any parts of




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- the USIB package would consist of 2 to 3 page summaries of the needs - product value sections of the 5 area studies; the 10 to 12 page needs/value section of the Navy paper (including CIA's views); and the Southeast Asia paper in its entirety because of the unusual nature of intelligence interests in that area.
- in order to allow for JCS review of the entire study and approval by the Secretary of Defense prior to 31 August, the USIB package should be sent out to the principals by 9 August and scheduled for the 16 August USIB agenda.
- DOD (Hughes and [redacted] with some help from us, will assemble the USIB package and [redacted] will be responsible for timing and scheduling.

All things considered, the entire exercise has gone remarkably well. The DOD study in its entirety will be slightly voluminous and probably will have to have some sort of Executive Summary for the 40 Committee members.

Looking ahead to the time that the DOD study is received by the DCI, we will be prepared to do a briefing memo on it for his use in subsequent 40 Committee consideration of its response to the President.



Chief
DDI/Information Requirements Staff

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SYSTEM FOR VALUE JUDGMENTS

USE defines the principal purpose and level of direct intelligence support. Rate as to the principal kind of intelligence support to which the information contributes.

I. At the White House/NSC level: _____

- Policy formulation relative to treaties, agreements, alliances, and regional security matters which are critical to the relative strategic positions of the U.S., the USSR and the PRC.
- Verification of compliances with any security agreements and consideration of other events critical to negotiations and White House/NSC decisions relative to national security objectives.
- (E. g., SAL; Vietnam cease-fire; Mid-East hostilities; MBFR).

II. At the NSC-member and OSD levels:

- Strategic threat analysis; _____
- U.S. force planning;

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- Planning for research development, engineering and evaluation of U.S. strategic weapons systems and the development of electronic countermeasures against opposing weapons systems;
- Resource and technology considerations concerning maintenance of U.S. strategic force capabilities;
- (E.g., Chinese missile deployments for support to NSC/NSSM 17; Soviet ICBM capabilities for O/DDR&E planning; SA-3 command and control guidance signals for countermeasures planning by O/DDR&E.

III. At the JCS level:

- Approval of force structure proposals, including doctrine, concepts and plans for U.S. strategic and general purpose forces;
- Development of operational requirements for the unified and specified commands including execution of contingency plans.

IV. At the military service level:

- Formulation of service force level proposals;
- Formulation of proposals for weapons system development and improvement and for the development of countermeasures

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V. At the operational field force level:

- Development of tactics, operational plans, force needs and area contingency plans.
- Maintenance of contingency plans and the force operational readiness for execution of such contingency plans in accordance with JCS operational requirements.
- Direct support to field commands and force units for the protection of such forces.

CONTRIBUTION defines the quantity of information contributed by the program in question for production of the kind of intelligence support designated under "USE":

1. ☐ Contributed over 90% of all information used for the designated intelligence support.
2. ☐ Contributed between 50 and 90%.
3. ☐ Contributed between 20 and 50%.
4. ☐ Contributed little or none.

VALUE defines the quality of the contribution in terms of its effect on the adequacy of the intelligence support provided the policy maker, force planner, military commanders and operating forces:

1. Essential - intelligence could not have been produced without it.
2. Important - important and highly useful but not essential to the major thrust or conclusions of the intelligence support.

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3. Supplemental - of general background interest but does not make an important contribution to the intelligence support.
4. Highly marginal or no value.

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